AN ARGUMENT FOR QUALITY AND APPROPRIATE
QUANTITY OF ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN ANTI-DRUG
FORCES
FORWARD
United States military equipment, training,
and intelligence sharing, has been generally predicated on imperfect
reasoning going back to Vietnam; however, most recently it is
reflected in our support of El Salvador between '82-'91. Then,
the general premise was to "dump" appropriate levels
of outdated military supplies, give only semi-sophisticated
military education, and limit intelligence to our allies. Clearly,
as America heads dangerously into the 21st Century, we need
to reassess this flawed policy.
DISCUSSION
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution
of the former Soviet Union, the world has seen an increase in
conflict. Approximately 67 conflicts were recorded by the National
Defense Council Foundation multi-source count in 1997 alone.
Most were "Multiple Regional Conflicts"(MRC's) or
Low Intensity Conflicts(LIC's). Ironically, hundreds of millions
of lives are affected in socio-economic, political, and security
ways because of this turmoil. In turn, this impacts on America's
ability to conduct our business in the 190 plus community of
nations. Our own demographics, business interests, and security
dictate that we engage proactively in world affairs. Now, as
America is temporarily the clear leader, we must support a network
of entities throughout the planet for dual purposes, i.e. to
keep America moving forward, and to pull more nations with us
in accomplishing democratic and "light-side" capitalistic
objectives (Light-side capitalism is capitalism which is legal,
has positive effects on communities and individuals, enhances
democratic institutions, is non-monopolistic, and provides hope
and security. This, vs. "dark side" capitalism, which
is illegal, narcissistic, anti-democratic, dictatorial, and
designed for immediate use. This bifurcation of Capitalism is
necessary to define problems specifically related to Narco activities.)
Clearly, America has several tools in doing
this. For instance, leading by example in all facets of our
own conduct is one. Exacting direct and indirect pressure is
another (high-lighting Human Rights concerns). Offering assistance
is yet a further option. To stay in a preeminent leadership
position world-wide, we must maximize our ability to do all
simultaneously, in the best way possible.
In regard to the latter option, offering assistance
is the least expensive means to further future goals. America
should update its system on how one should assist. During the
Cold War, our allies were for the most part sub-divided into
categories by their abilities to read/write, speak English and
flourish within our organizational structure. The less they
could do this, the more inferior equipment and training they
received. Attempts were made to "up-grade" certain
elements, however, generally speaking, everything was "dumbed
down" to push people through courses. This or, they were
provided equipment "an ape could handle". When circumstances
warranted it, we would provide contractors (some from companies
from which the equipment came, or some from independent companies).
The classic case here is the Vinelle Corporation that assisted
the Saudis, who were not detail oriented, a U.S. company which
has since been used extensively in other places.
In the 80's, particularly with our Spanish-speaking
allies, there was a trend to train foreign military students
in a more user friendly way. Texts, instruction, and demonstration
were conducted in native languages while more and better computers
fueled the quality of learning. This was particularly stressed
in Aviation, Special Operation and Intelligence fields. Now,
with a more erudite allied constituency, their appetite for
more sophisticated equipment insued as they mastered the obsolete
items that they had been provided. In the case of wealthy or
politically powerful countries, limited lending, conditional
sale, or sale of "stripped down" advanced models was
extended. However, in this time frame, caution was the operative
word. This, as to not aggravate certain balance of power issues
and in some cases start accelerated arms races. Again, most
of this was in a "bi-polar" context of the Soviet
Union versus the US in a pre-1991 setting.
In 1998 conditions have changed across the board.
This has impacted on a host of decisions and approaches to our
nation's security. One question is, what is an allies' real-priority
for support? Then how to configure our network with them to
insure mutual safety and future stability? What level of quality
and quantity to provide? How to support it appropriately, and
could the ally support our support? In that regard, a more current
definition will lead to every limited U.S. dollar spent having
meaning to America's security and future prosperity.
Having discussed this, the current situations
of support are mostly convoluted, haphazard, and without clear
priority. Some make sense, like helping Israel and select Middle
Eastern countries in a delicate "balance of power"
scenario to contain rogue elements and insure trade. However,
some situations of support like in Africa, Bosnia, and Asia
have incomplete rationale mainly shaped by CNN or politics.
This, while neglecting our own backyard/neighbors, i.e. our
own hemisphere.
SPECIFICS
In the case of aid to Colombia for anti-drug
activities, a central theme emerges that reflects America's
lack of resolve and thoughtfulness...that being the key issue
of mobility support essential to reducing conflict. It centers
around the choice of helicopters to be provided. Clearly, the
rational person/authority on our side should be demanding first-line
quality equipment, and at appropriate levels. However, the sad
fact is that the Executive Branch (both US Department of State
[DOS], Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP]) and fractious
groups within the Legislative Branch, have impeded these actions.
This, ostensibly because either it would contribute to "human
rights violations, raise violence, or is not necessary because
of adequate performance of obsolete equipment."
To dissect these three main arguments is an
imperative. First, a confident army or police engenders fewer,
"human rights violations." Especially, one where their
training, support, and even leadership has been influenced by
American learned experiences in this area. The primary juxtaposing
examples are El Salvador's Army & Police in 1979-83, when
American influence in this area was at an all time low, and
later from 1984-91, when the combined policies of the social-political,
economic, and military plan shaped by both Ambassadors Dean
Hinton and Thomas Pickering (which stressed human rights, economic
and social-justice, and security) started working. It was "turn
on the tap", but only allow the flow to grow stronger with
acceptance of guidance related to said plan, but "turn
on the damn tap!" The commitment and beginning of consistency
was a confidence builder which was reflected in a more relatively
professional army and police. Second, this "professionalization"
wound up reducing both direct and collateral combat casualties
and put the enemy Salvadorian FMLN guerillas in a situation
whereby battlefield combat proved fruitless and was displaced
by meaningful negotiation. The end result was a gradual secession
of hostilities and a measure of power sharing (which is still
in place 7 years later). Thirdly, the last argument is a rationalization
based on lack of experience and knowledge in Low Intensity Conflicts
(LIC's) by bureaucrats and politicians. The poorer the support,
the longer and more costly it will take to get to a conclusion
either way. The resulting consequence is more people on both
sides are killed. It seems the valuable lessons on the conflict
in El Salvador have been forgotten, dooming us to repeat mistakes.
Furthermore, in the case of Colombia, as the conflict continues,
it means more drug volume is generated by the narco-guerillas
to offset their costs for the advantage as they move towards
Phase 3 Narco-Guerrilla war (see appendix 6 for explanation
of Phases). Later, the more "volume" coming into points
like American markets means more consumer use. Then, high levels
of volume become the norm, causing a quantum expansion in the
cost in lives and money in both America and Colombia. Simply
put, the investment of appropriate first line training, equipment,
and intelligence at the front-end, means substantially reduced
costs at the back-end because of a limiting of collateral damage
to the respective societies, i.e. American and Colombian neighborhoods.
Additionally, it will shape a compression in time, preventing
the situation from being dragged out. As an example, the case
of El Salvador lacked part of this equation (that being complete
adherence to 1st line-support [like better helicopters, both
utility and combat], which caused the war there to be drawn-out
probably a year or two longer escalating costs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Clearly, America should support the anti-drug
forces of countries like Colombia as they have earned our support.
The test case identified by both Congressmen Ben Gilman (R-NY)
and Dan Burton (R-IN) is centered around the mobility issue.
This, because the narco-guerrilla conflict over the vast expanses
of Colombia, demands it. Accordingly, the poor choices offered
currently (the MI-17's, UH-IH, Super Huey, and Bell 212's Helicopters)
are inadequate to thwart drugs and reduce combat. Now is the
perfect time to provide safer and more capable utility helicopters
UH-60L models to illustrate a new philosophy in support (see
appendices 1-5). This conclusion is based on NDCF's 20 fact
finding missions to Colombia since 1985. Additionally, NDCF
feels that 1) the CNP can support these more advanced type aircraft,
2) they have the capable pilots to fly them and 3) they have
the will to employ them effectively. Among the many advantages
outlined in the appendices, the most glaring is that the UH-60L's
would also allow eradication of heroin at the over 8000 foot
plus level in a more cost effective manner. This will help substantially
in reducing this expanding threat.
After this test issue has been resolved, other
type equipment, training and intelligence, which correctively
"tunes" the capability and professionalism of both
the Army and Police, should quickly follow. Appropriate advisory
efforts should be reinstituted. Now, this does not mean we should
jump in the 82nd Airborne...but have a well selected /heeled/
capped advisory effort with a very limited logistical support
element. The basic parameters of the El Salvador effort are
adequate in terms of the capping at 55 times 8 (440 military
advisors) 100 times 8 (800 or medical personnel) and other type
personnel times 8...which hypothetically compensates for the
size and population of Colombia vs. El Salvador. DEA and FBI
support levels should be relative to task. Keeping in mind,
that underlining this whole effort should be the commitment
of an assistance formula (which must be determined by Congress)
like the 3/4 Economic Aid to 1/4 Military Aid that was used
in the case of El Salvador. In the case of Colombia it may be
the reverse, i.e., 1/4 Economic Aid to 3/4 Military aid. To
not do the aforementioned, means America, the Clinton Administration,
the Republican led Congress, and ourselves are not serious about
reducing the drug war to a manageable level, saving lives, and
preserving both Colombia's Democracy and eventually our own.
To put it in James Carvillian terms, "It's about reduction
stupid!" Reduction of total volume and thus, Narco influence
will reduce violence and lead to a meaningful negotiated settlement.
To paraphrase the late General Edward G. Lansdale's famous quote,
"You have to take the cause away from the guerilla..."
to achieve peace. In the case of Colombia, "You have
to take away the narco money from the guerilla," additionally,
for the same result. Furthermore, to quote the Chairman of the
House Committee on International Relations, Congressman Benjamin
Gilman, in a letter to the Director General of the Colombian
National Police (dated 13 January 1998);
"It is my hope that now that the
U.S. government has appropriated monies in FY 1998 to
provide the CNP with three Blackhawk utility helicopters
in order to wage a more effective and aggressive effort
against illicit drug production, that the Colombian
government will match our commitment and will provide
funding through the Colombian Defense Ministry for three
more Blackhawk helicopters for the DANTI. Such a gesture
would be most welcomed here by the many friends of the
CNP and all those other courageous and dedicated people
in Colombia who are committed to fighting the scourge
of illicit drugs and the adverse impact it has on your
democratic society, as well as ours."
Prepared by Major F. Andy Messing, Jr. USAR
(Ret.) Special Forces, Executive Director of the NDCF, who has
been to 27 Conflicts World-Wide. Also assisted, researched,
and edited by Ms. Stella Vesga, and reviewed by Mr. Josh Gabriel.
The National Defense Council Foundation is a Defense and Foreign
Affairs Think Tank established in 1978 which examines small
conflicts and drug wars. The Web Site is http://www.ndcf.org
.
Note: The base documents for this report are
"U.S. Drug Control Policy and International Operations"
(1990). Subtitled "Eradication: Narco-Guerilla Dynamics;
and, The Pitfalls of Militarizing the Drug Fight." Authored
by Major F. Andy Messing Jr. and Allen B. Hazlewood, Consultant....&
"Drug War: The NDCF Colombia Report 1997" by Messing
and Major Gilbert Macklin, USMC (ret.), Staff Director.